UNIT 10 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION

1. What do you know about the functions of the Directorate General for

Bilateral Cooperation? What matters does the Directorate General for

Bilateral Cooperation deal with? What do the desk-officers do? Who

studies and analyses experience of candidate countries for the EU accession?

Which Department is responsible for the relations with the Russian

Federation? Which Department deals with Ukraine’s partici pation

in the Commonwealth of Independent States? Which Department oversees

Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the West European countries?

Which subdivision pays special attention to the European and Euro-

Atlantic integration of Ukraine? What are the functions of the Third

Territorial Department? Which Departments focus on the development

of relations with the states neighboring with Ukraine? Which subdivision

deals with the problems of minimizing negative consequences of

the EU? Which Department is responsible for the relations with the

North American states? Is there a separate department to monitor the

relations with the USA? What are the functions of the Fifth Territorial

Department? Which Department deals with Ukraine’s advance ment to

the Middle East and African markets? What are the functions of Special

Envoy of Ukraine to the Middle East?

2. You are going to read a text about the Directorate General for European

Integration. Which of the following concepts can you expect in the

text? Why or why not?

Turkey USA South Europe partici pation respon sible

focus Japan Russian Federation Balkan region Canada

territorial Poland CIS minimizing cooperation

Slovakia Caucasus West Europe enlargement Middle East

bilateral China NATO integration India

package desk-officer North Europe competence Special Envoy

Hungary key issues European Union humani tarian Asian-Pacific

rela tions Africa Euro-Atlantic consequences Central Asia

negative division Central Europe strategic partner Southern Asia

agenda economic East Europe advancing neighboring

Reform markets political issues Caribbean Latin America

3. You are going to read seven passages about the Directorate General

for Bilateral Cooperation (DGBC). For questions 1–20 choose from

texts A – G. The texts may be chosen more than once. When more than

one answer is required, they may be given in any order. There is an example

at the beginning (0).

A. DGBC in general

Which of DGBC Departments: B. The First Territorial Department

C. The Second Territorial Department

D. The Third Territorial Department

E. The Forth Territorial Department

F. The Fifth Territorial Department

G. The Sixth Territorial Department

A B C D E F G

emerged following structural changes 0 •

has a separate division responsible for the

relations with one country only

is responsible for the bilateral relations with

Armenia

takes into account issues related to NATO 3

oversees the bilateral relations with Latvia 4

deals with the problems the EU enlargement 5

is responsible for the bilateral relations with

Argentina

deals with the bilateral relations with Indonesia 7

pays special attention to the relations with the

neighboring states

deals with economic and humani tarian aspects

of bilateral relations

oversees Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the

Far Eastern countries

is responsible for the bilateral relations with

Australia

monitors Ukraine’s bilateral relations with

Nigeria

deals with the bilateral relations with Iran 13

is responsible for bilateral relations with all

countries of the world

oversees Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the

West European countries

has a Special Envoy 16

pays special attention to the European and Euro-

Atlantic integration of Ukraine

focuses on the rela tions with Russia 18

oversees the bilateral relations with Cuba 19

deals with Ukraine’s partici pation in the

Commonwealth of Independent States

A The Directorate General for Bilateral Cooperation was created as

a result of the latest structural reform of the Ministry in 2001.Matters

falling within the scope of the Department relate to building

bilateral relations with all countries of the world. As a rule, there is a deskofficer

for each foreign country or a group of states. Activities of territorial

departments, as well as those of the Directorate General on the whole, are

not limited to a package of political issues, as the De partments analyzes

information on Ukraine’s coop eration with other countries in economic and

humani tarian spheres as well.

B The First Territorial Department covers rela tions with the Russian

Federation. Another big package of issues dealt with by the Department

are those relating to Ukraine’s partici pation in the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS).

C The Second Territorial Department oversees Ukraine’s bilateral relations

with the West, North and South European states. The majority

of countries, covered by the Depart ment, are the EU and NATO

members, that is why particular attention is attached to the development of

relations with them in the context of European and Euro-Atlantic integration

of Ukraine.

D Work of the Third Territorial Department is focused on relations

and cooperation of Ukraine with the states of East and Central

Europe, the Balkan region, the Caucasus and Turkey. The Department’s

special attention is focused at the development of relations with the

states neighboring with Ukraine, in particular with Poland, Slovakia and

Hungary, which are successfully advancing in their course toward European

and Euro-Atlantic integra tion. The problem of minimizing negative consequences

of the EU enlargement for the development of bilateral relations is

on the agenda of relations with those states.

E The Forth Territorial Department is respon sible for Ukraine’s bilateral

relations with the USA, Canada, Latin American and Caribbean

states. One of key issues within the Department’s competence, which

is dealt with by a separate division, is building relations with Ukraine’s strategic

partner – the United States of America, as well as with Canada.

F The Fifth Territorial Department covers bilat eral relations with the

states of Asian-Pacific region and Central and Southern Asia. Its

competence in particular extends to relations with China, Japan

and India, as well as with new independent states of Central Asia, which

emerged on the political map of the world after the collapse of the USSR

(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

G The Sixth Territorial Department is charged with issues concerning

relations with the Middle East and African states. The role of

this Department is in creasing in the context of Ukraine’s gradual

advance ment to the markets of these states. Day-to-day ac tivities of the Department

are coordinated with a recently created institution of Special Envoy

of Ukraine to the Middle East.

4. Go back to exercises 1 and 2. Can you answer the questions now?

5. Find in the text the words meaning:

1. Департамент двостороннього співробітництва; 2. в результаті струк-

турної реформи; 3.до компетенції Департаменту належать питання;

4. розбудова двосторонніх відносин з усіма країнами світу; 5. в основу

роботи Департаменту покладений принцип; 6. геополітичний розподі-

лу відповідальності; 7. ключові структурні складові; 8. територіальне

управління; 9. відповідальний співробітник; 10. Не обмежуватися ви-

ключно комплексом політичних питань; 11. узагальнювати інформа-

цію щодо стану співробітництва; 12. економічна та гуманітарна сфери;

13. блок питань; 14. участь України; 15. Співдружність Незалежних

Держав; 16. країни Західної, Північної та Південної Європи; 17. чле-

ни Європейського Союзу і НАТО; 18. приділяти особливу увагу; 19. в

контексті європейської і євроатлантичної інтеграції; 20. країни Цен-

тральної та Східної Європи; 21. Балканський регіон; 22. Кавказ; 23.Ту-

реччина; 24. сусідні з Україною держави; 25. Польща; 26. Словаччина;

27. Угорщина; 28. успішно просуватися обраним курсом; 29. європей-

ська та євроатлантична інтеграція; 30. на порядку денному; 31. про-

блема мінімалізації негативних наслідків розширення ЄС для України;

32. посідати особливе місце; 33. США; 34. Канада; 35. країни Латин-

ської Америки; 36. країни Карибського басейну; 37. основні питан-

ня, що належать до компетенції управління; 38. питання, яким відає

окремий відділ; 39. стратегічний партнер; 40. країни азіатсько-тихо-

океанського регіону; 41. країни Центральної та Південної Азії; 42. на-

лежати до сфери компетенції; 43. Китай; 44. Японія; 45. Індія; 46. нові

незалежні країни Центральної Азії; 47. з’явллятися на політичній карті

світу; 48. розпад СРСР; 49. Казахстан; 50. Туркменистан; 51. Узбекис-

тан; 52. країни Близького та Середнього Сходу; 53. Африканські кра-

їни; 54. роль управління зростає; 55. в контексті поступового виходу;

56. ринки країн; 57. повсякденна діяльність; 58. координувати; 59. не-

щодавно створений; 60. інститут Спеціального Представника України

на Близькому Сході.

6. Fill in the blanks in the sentences below with the English equivalents

of the words and word-combinations from exercise 5.

1. The Directorate General for Bilateral __________ was created as a result

of the latest structural reform of the Ministry. 2. The Directorate’s tasks relate to building __________ relations with all countries of the world. 3. Tthere

is a desk __________ for each country or a group of states. 4. The Directorate’s

tasks are not limited to political __________, as it also analyzes

Ukraine’s coop eration with other countries in economic and __________

spheres. 5. The First Territorial Department __________ rela tions with the

Russian Federation. 6. The First Territorial Department is also responsible

for Ukraine’s partici pation in the __________ of Independent States. 7. The

Second Territorial Department deals wirh Ukraine’s __________ relations

with the West, North and South European states. 8. The Second Territorial

Department attaches a particular attention to the issues of European and

Euro-Atlantic __________ of Ukraine. 9. The Third Territorial Department

__________ on relations of Ukraine with the states of East and Central Europe,

the Balkan region, the Caucasus and Turkey. 10. The Third Territorial

Department focuses on the development of relations with the __________

states. 11. Poland, Slovakia and Hungary successfully __________ toward

European and Euro-Atlantic integra tion. 12. The Third Territorial Department

deals with the problems of minimizing negative __________ of the

EU enlargement. 13. The Forth Territorial Department is respon sible for

Ukraine’s __________relations with the North and Latin Americas. 14. The

Forth Territorial Department has a separate __________ for the development

of relations with Ukraine’s __________partners — the USA and

Canada. 14. The Fifth __________Department covers bilat eral ______

____ with the of Asian-Pacific region and Central and Southern Asian

states. 15. The Fifth Territorial Department is respon sible for Ukraine’s relations

with Far Eastern countries and the new __________ states of Central

Asia, which appeared on the __________map of the world after the ____

______ of the USSR (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 16. The

Sixth Territorial Department monitors the relations with the __________ East

and African states. 17. The Sixth Territorial Department’s role is in creasing

because of Ukraine’s advance ment to the markets of Asian states. 18. The

Sixth Territorial Department’s performance is __________ by a recently

created institution of Special __________of Ukraine to the Middle East.

7. Render the following into English.

СНД; ЄС; країни Західної, Північної та Південної Європи; НАТО;

країни Центральної та Східної Європи; Балканський регіон; Кавказ;

Туреччина; Польща; Словаччина; Угорщина; США; Канада; країни

Латинської Америки; країни Карибського басейну; країни Азіатсько-Тихоокеанського регіону; країни Центральної та Південної Азії; Ки-

тай; Японія; Індія; нові незалежні країни Центральної Азії; СРСР; Ка-

захстан; Туркменистан; Узбекистан; країни Близького та Середнього

Сходу; Африканські країни; Близький Схід.

8. Work in pairs. Reproduce the texts about the Directorate General for

Bilateral Cooperation to your partner. Use the headlines below as the

backbone for your story.

1. The Directorate General for Bilateral Cooperation: General Background

2. The First Territorial Department

3. The Second Territorial Department

4. The Third Territorial Department

5. The Forth Territorial Department

6. The Fifth Territorial Department

7. The Sixth Territorial Department

9. Read the texts (adapted from the articles by Viktor ZAMYATIN in

The Day of March 30 and Marina OLIYNYK, Natalia TROFIMOVA

and Volodymyr SONIUK in The Day of April 27, 2004) and compare

Ukraine’s problems in bilateral relations with different countries.

1. Forging a Mature Relationship

The visit to Kyiv of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and

Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, and the participation of US

former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a Kyiv international conference

a month ago and her recent article in The New York Times, and the

Foreign Policy Committee session earlier this month in Washington are sure

signs of Washington’s renewed interest in Ukraine.

Although most of the US-Ukrainian problems are still the same as they were

about five years ago, the overall level of bilateral relations is quite far from

that of the late 1990s.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is inclined to believe that Washington

has come to the conclusion that it should maintain a meaningful dialogue

with Ukraine and that the period of a cool relationship is over. Non-governmental

experts in both countries claim that marked changes in the attitude toward Kyiv were also caused by what is going on in Russia. They point out

that Russia is now a far longer way from a democratic society than it was a

few years ago: the state is attempting to restore an empire and attacking big

business (re: the Khodorkovskyi case). It is for this reason that Ukraine is

again being considered a key state in the region. Many experts say unofficially

that “Ukraine must not be lost.” What can be considered indirect proof

of the fact that the White House is at least taking these ideas into account is

recent public criticism of Russia by US Secretary of State Colin Powell that

despite Russia still being of great importance for the United States in terms

of international security. That the US seems to have revised some priorities

in its policies toward Eastern Europe means that it is closely watching

domestic developments in this region’s countries, especially in Ukraine. It

is an open secret that this kind of attention reaches its peak during times of

parliamentary and presidential elections, and it is quite clear from this perspective

why there were and will be so many visits and why the press has

evinced much more interest in Ukraine than before. Washington wants to

know who and what it will deal with to map out its policies and defend its

interests, what rules it will have to play, and to what extent the dialog can be

sincere. Approaches like this were once applied to Central Europe, Russia,

and Turkey.

As things stand today, it would be in US interests if Ukraine were successfully

developing according to overall European standards, which could in

turn set the likely limits of relations, that is, partnership for achieving certain

concrete goals, long-term partnership and prospective alliance, or just

an equitable relationship. It is clear from this perspective why the United

States considers every presidential and parliamentary election in Ukraine as

crucial: this will show what rules will be established, who will take certain

commitments, and the way the latter should be met.

It is for this reason that US officials, while admitting that Ukraine’s decision

to send a brigade to Iraq as part of the multinational stabilization force

helped the relations to thaw out, have increasingly emphasized of late that

Iraq is only one side of the coin, which is not enough to achieve success.

The problems in the relations between the two states can be divided into

several blocks.

As to relations in the field of security, the most telling example of their

development is Iraq and the fact that almost all US officials have been in126

dicating in the past few months that Washington supports Ukraine’s aspiration

for the fullest possible Euro-Atlantic integration. Nobody has ever

said, however, what decisions NATO’s Istanbul summit in June will make

with respect to Ukraine, for example, whether the NATO Membership and

Intensified Political Dialog Plan will be applied to Ukraine. This being a

purely political question, Western and Kyiv sources are convinced that the

decision will not be made this year. It goes without saying that the United

States still continues to play the crucial role in making decision about the

future of NATO as a whole, in spite of an apparent crisis of relations in this

trans-Atlantic organization. As the United States has never stopped working

with Ukraine at the level of experts, one can suppose that US interest in

Ukraine’s integration with the Euro-Atlantic space is not just a declaration

— especially against the background of the Black Sea region and Middle

East situation as well as uncertainty over the development of relations between

the West and Russia.

Both political and international security relations contain a number of sensitive

points stemming exclusively from the Ukrainian domestic policy. Among

them is the closure of Radio Continent, cancellation of the contract between

Radio Dovira and Radio Liberty, a conflict between the pro-governmental

and opposition groups of Ukrainian politicians, and a logic not always clear

of some decisions made by the Ukrainian government.

Over and over again, US official representatives as well as the NATO leadership

stress that further dialog with Ukraine will depend exclusively on its

domestic development. There is nothing extraordinary in the demands to

obey the rules accepted in the community which Ukraine is trying to enter,

and it is not at all necessary to devise any ways of our own in this respect.

Economic relations, considered quite good in both countries, might in reality

be far better. Ukraine still does not enjoy market economy status, is formally

subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment (it is annually suspended by a special

Congress decision at the US president’s request). Ukraine and the US

have not yet fully agreed to sign a protocol on mutual access to the markets

of goods and services, a must for joining the World Trade Organization. The

United States believes Ukraine has not yet achieved the required level of

intellectual property protection, does not allow companies to adequately defend

their rights in court, and failed to create a favorable and law-governed

investment climate. Yet, Washington continues to express its support for

Ukraine’s WTO membership. Therefore, the question lies again in the politi127

cal plane, and Ukraine is expected to take difficult but necessary steps. This

would in turn strengthen Kyiv’s ability to protect its own interests as in the

much-publicized antidumping cases.

Another aspect of economic cooperation still remains fairly hypothetical:

words of thanks for the participation of Ukrainian servicemen in the Iraq

stabilization operation have not yet materialized into concrete reconstruction

contracts. We know that more than thirty Ukrainian companies have

already filed bids for various Iraq reconstruction projects. We also know

that this is a difficult thing to do even in the United States itself — suffice

it to recall the recent refusal to award an Iraq reconstruction contract to the

Halliburton Company. Although the White House keeps promising political

support, no tangible signs of progress are in sight.

It is perhaps later that Europe will adequately assess the importance of the

Odesa-Brody-Polish territory oil pipeline for its energy needs. This project

might have been dead in the water had the US not intervened (also instructive

is the story of the attempts to use this transit route in the reverse mode).

Diplomatic sources report that Ukraine takes a calm view of the emphasis

the US administration puts on problems of the domestic situation and freedom

of expression, for the main thing is to concentrate on specific goals. The

problem, however, is that we will certainly not make any progress in achieving

these “specific goals” unless we obey a certain set of rules that are the

same for all “novices.”

Naturally, a thaw in the current US-Ukrainian dialog can in itself be considered

as an achievement for both sides. However, practical results will

remain a burning issue even after the elections in Ukraine and the US, which

will might have a Democratic administration. All we can assert is that the

romantic period in the US-Ukrainian relations has long sunk into history,

while a mature relationship requires a basis still to be built.

2. Duma Does Not Have to Deliberate for Ukraine

Diplomatically speaking, the Russian Duma acted in an unexpected manner

the very next day after ratifying the SES agreement with Ukraine, adopting

a message to Verkhovna Rada, expressing concern over the memorandum of

understanding between Ukraine and NATO, as well as the National Television

and Radio Council’s recommendations to the effect that television and radio broadcasts be only in the Ukrainian language. The document stresses

that the Duma deputies are “perplexed by Verkhovna Rada’s ratification of

the Ukraine – NATO memorandum of understanding, it being another practical

arrangement relating to NATO eastward movement plans... The attempts

to administratively crowd out or ban the Russian language in Ukraine, a

language that has for centuries served as a means of interethnic communication

on the territories of our countries, ignore the Ukrainian – Russian

bilingual tradition that took shape there, and damage civil rights in Ukraine,

deserving criticism on the part of responsible Ukrainian politicians.” Below

are Ukrainian deputies’ commentaries on the Duma’s message. It should be

noted, however, that the Russian Duma has created a questionable information

background for the Russian President who began a two-day visit to

Ukraine, April 22.

Leonid KRAVCHUK (SDPU(O)):

I am constantly surprised by the Russian Duma’s stand. Now they are busy

dealing with Sevastopol, then the Crimea, then Tuzla. This time they decided

to recommend what kind of policy we have with regard to NATO and

the official language. If we acted that way, in the same imperial spirit, we

would supply them with a number of observations and admonitions. To our

credit, we do no such things. We respect the Russian state and its stand. No

one forbids the Russian language in Ukraine, it’s just that we would rather

hear Ukrainian on the national channels. We’ve heard so much, for so

long about some seventy-five percent songs being sung here in languages

other than Ukrainian, that Russian is the only language spoken in the

Ukrainian sports world, let alone the unfortunate condition of Ukrainian

book-publishing. There are spheres of life where you almost never hear

Ukrainian. It got so that we only see and hear Alla Pugacheva and Filip

Kirkorov at the Ukraine Palace. Yet the instant someone tries to raise this

matter, there are shouts about pressure, that such matters must be resolved

only on a voluntary basis. We have our laws, our constitution. It is clearly

laid down that the official Ukrainian language must be used in official

places, such as the Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, Presidential Administration,

local authorities. Daily usage is another matter. No one makes

you speak Ukrainian at home, in the kitchen, having tea or sharing drinks

with friends. You know English? Welcome to use it. Or French, German,

Russian. That’s your private business. But on official premises, in offices,

you can’t do as you wish, otherwise why enact all those laws, why proclaim that Ukrainian is the official language? I am firmly of the opinion that the

Russian Duma should not really bother deliberating things for Ukraine. I

can only describe their current stand as a manifestation of foreign political

primitivism and provincialism, for they apparently consider their strategic

neighbor part of their sphere of influence. We have people and structures

entitled to make decisions, and we shall conduct the kind of domestic policy

we deem necessary, a policy answering the national interests of Ukraine and

the foreign political concept, including the European choice and the law on

Ukrainian as the official language.

Mykola ZHULYNSKY (Our Ukraine):

We are witness to the Russian Duma’s constant attempts to teach us what

kind of domestic policy we should carry out. Ukraine must focus on consolidating

Ukrainian society in the first place. The language is an important

consolidating factor. Our highest priority is to establish the status of Ukrainian

as the official language. We must consider ways to introduce Ukrainian

as the official language of instruction in school, college, and university, also

in the latter-day technologies, so the Ukrainian people can finally have access

to our nation’s books and radio... SES is apparently a tool, with which

Russia wants to take a firm hold of Ukraine, not only economically, but

also politically. Their attempt to prove that Ukraine is upsetting the Ukrainian-

Russian bilingual harmony is a bottomless argument, for there is actually

no such harmony; Ukraine is dominated by the Russian language and

this dominance is clearly apparent. The Duma’s current stand is nothing

new. In 1995, the then President Boris Yeltsin signed a document relating

to Russia’s policy with regard to the CIS countries. It reads that Russian

television and radio must be extended to the countries in Russia’s immediate

neighborhood, that Russian publications must be supported, and that Russian

must train cadre for the CIS countries. What’s the difference between

these clauses and the policy waged by the late Soviet Union? Practically

none. However, the current Duma’s statement is like when your neighbor

visits to tell you that the pieces of your furniture are in the wrong places, that

your lamp shade is the wrong color, that you should rearrange your potted

flowers, and finally, that you’re speaking the wrong language, that you must

communicate with him in the language your neighbor uses at home. I don’t

think that any parliament, in any civilized country, would deem it possible to

respond to the domestic situation in a neighboring country the way the Russian

Parliament did. It’s now perfectly clear why Russia needs that single economic space. As a basis on which to restore the Soviet Union. We know

from history that the treaty forming the USSR was preceded by Russia’s

economic policy strongly reminiscent of today’s. Ukraine’s only alternative

is NATO and EU membership, the sooner the better, so we can rid ourselves

of Moscow’s offhand interferences.

Serhiy SHEVCHUK (NDP):

The Russian Duma formed only recently. They are faced with many domestic

and foreign polici problems, so I was amazed at the speed with which

the Duma responded to Ukraine’s foreign economic and domestic strategic

initiatives, the more so that Ukraine has long worked to carry them out and

made no secret of them. We believe that we are on the right path, moving

in the direction of European and Euro- Atlantic integration. Our parliament

supported the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the political leadership

with a majority of votes; therefore, this statement of the Russian Duma

can be regarded as a delicate (so far) interference into Ukrainian internal

affairs. Needless to say, it will have a sequel, but I think it won’t be successful,

that our parliament and the political leadership will not alter the

course proclaimed by the president in his message, and laid down in other

strategic documents.

As for the language, on my way to parliament, I’d tuned my car radio in to

a dozen FM stations and heard Ukrainian on one or two. The rest were in

Russian. Meaning that Russia is just trying to add fuel to the fire. Russia

should better consider securing millions of ethnic Ukrainians their rights

the way the Russians in Ukraine have them. Otherwise it is a brutally asymmetrical

approach to the language issue and we must reject it.

Borys OLIYNYK (CPU):

The Russian Duma can’t tell us what to do, and we don’t censor their

decisions. I have personally opposed and will continue to oppose Ukraine’s

NATO membership, for I have witnessed them in action when I got under

their bomb raid in Kosovo. Yet I stress that the resolution of our parliament

is an expression of will of a sovereign country.

Volodymyr HOSHOVSKY (People’s Choice Groups of People’s

Deputies):

This is evidence of not only the expansion of Russian capital in Ukraine,

but also Russia’s interference in Ukrainian political affairs. This is not

admissible. I think that the Duma had no right to come out with such statements

if Russia really wants to have neighborly relations with Ukraine. But

if Russia has other objectives in mind, any citizen of Ukraine, whatever his

attitude toward Russian politics, will say mind to your own business. Of

course, this statement will infuriate the Ukrainian Parliament.

Stepan KHMARA (BYuT):

This is flagrant interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. I wish our parliamentary

majority had made the proper conclusions and revised their attitude

toward SES. Russia is impudently mounting pressure on Ukraine, already

openly meddling in our affairs. I think that our Foreign Ministry must forward

a stern note in response to the Russian Duma’s statement, and the

Ukrainian Parliament should, of course, show its reaction.

10. Write a 300-word essay on the Directorate General for Bilateral Cooperation,

the content of its work and the functions of its subdivisions.