UNIT 8 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE MINISTER AND HIS OFFICE

1. What do you know about the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

What are the functions of the State Secretary, the State Secretary

for European Integration and their Deputies? What does the Minister’s

Private Office do? Who researches and prepares materials for meetings

and negotiations? Who oversees the process of implementing the Minister’s

decisions and instructions? What are the functions of the Rapid

Response Center? What subdivision provides protection of the rights

and interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad? What subdivision studies

the latest news reports by the world media? What subdivision analyses

information from Ukrainian consu lar and diplomatic missions abroad?

What are the functions of the State Protocol Department? What subdivision

maintains the Ministry’s contacts and correspondence with foreign

diplomatic missions in Ukraine? What subdivision takes care of

functioning and protection of privileges and immunities of foreign diplomats

and diplomatic missions? Who organizes the meetings of heads

of foreign diplo matic missions with high-ranking Ukrainian officials?

What are the functions of the Press Service and the Press Club? What

is the difference between them?

2. You are going to read a text about the structure of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Which of the following concepts can you expect in thetext?

Why or why not?

media representa tive long-term situa tion reports legal issues

subdivi sion threat del egation international events accredita tion

briefings dynamic consu lar media coverage correspondence

exequaturs challenge protection infor mation needs protocol services signature balanced crises foreign communities coordina tion

immunities department implement official messages diplomatic corps

emergency incorporate oversee press center credentials

monitor model negotiations mission abroad news reports

response approximate experience rights and interests honorary consul

efficient rapid adminis ter diplomatic missions special tasks

oversight ambassador advisor information inspector

3. You are going to read a text about the structure of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. The names of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ structural

subdivisions and positions as well as of some other state agencies have

been removed from the article. Choose from the names (A – S) the one

that fits each gap (0 – 19). There is an example at the beginning (0).

Names of the structural subdivisions and positions

A Inspector General

B Directorates-General 0

C Ministry of Internal Affairs

D First Department

E State Secretary

F Department of Ambassadors-at-Large and Chief

Advisors

G Verkhovna Rada

H Press Club

I Deputies of State Secretary

J State Protocol Department

K Ministry of Foreign Affairs

L State Secretary for European Integration

M Head of the Press Service

N Minister’s Private Office

N Cabinet of Ministers

O Rapid Response Center

P Ministry of De fense

Q Press Service

R Ministry for Emer gencies

S Security Service

Present-day structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

(MFA) took shape as a result of the reform implemented in 2001. Following

major structural changes, the methods of work of the Ukrain

ian foreign policy agency now closely approximates classical European

models. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs today com prises six

_____________ (0) incorporating more than thirty departments. Among

the newly created posts are _____________ (1) and _____________ (2)

and their deputies. This is a dynamic and balanced structure, which en sures

smooth functioning of the whole foreign policy service of Ukraine and allows

it to respond rapidly and efficiently to contemporary challenges and

threats. The _____________ (3) of Ukraine is adminis tered by the Minister

with participation of the State Secretary, State Secretary for European Integration

and _____________ (4). Everyday activities of the head of the foreign

policy agency are ensured by the _____________ (5). The average age

of staff in the Minister’s Office is thirty years. Its nine staff members speak a

total of some 30 foreign languages. Almost all of them have had experience

of a long-term mission abroad. The Office researches and prepares materials

for meetings and negotiations with the Minister’s partici pation; it also

oversees the process of implementing his decisions and instructions. Each

day, about a hundred various documents are submitted for the Minister’s

signature.

_____________ (6) (RRC) operates under the Minister’s Private Office. This

subdivision was cre ated to increase the effectiveness of the Ministry’s response

to international events, to monitor crises and emergencies, and ensure

rapid and effective protection of the rights and interests of Ukrainian

citizens abroad. The Rapid Response Center is manned 24 hours a day. Several

times a day the Center prepares situa tion reports on the latest international

developments, studies latest news reports by the world media and

analyses information coming from Ukrainian consu lar and diplomatic missions

abroad. The Center carries out its activities in close coordina tion with

relevant subdivisions of the _____________ (7), _____________ (8), ____

_________ (9), _____________ (10) and other state agencies of Ukraine.

The performance of the _____________ (11), which is considered one of

the most responsible directions in any foreign policy service, is also closely

connected with activities of the Minister and the Ministry. The Department

is responsible for preparing and holding foreign visits of Ukrainian governmental

del egations headed by the Foreign Minister. It acts in close coopera95

tion with the protocol services of the President, the _____________ (12)

and _____________ (13) of Ukraine in matters related to visits of foreign

delegations in Ukraine. The State Protocol Department maintains the Ministry’s

working contacts and correspondence with foreign diplomatic missions

accredited in Ukraine. Other functions of the Department include accreditation

of representatives of foreign diplomatic corps, as well as issues of functioning

and protection of privileges and immunities of foreign diplomats

and diplomatic missions. The Department provides protocol support for the

pre sentation of credentials to the President and the pre sentation of copies of

credentials to the Minister by foreign ambassadors and the granting of exequaturs

to foreign honorary consuls. It also renders assistance in organizing

the meetings of heads of foreign diplo matic missions with high-ranking

Ukrainian officials, the leadership of the MFA – at the level of Minister,

State Secretaries and their deputies – as well as with heads of other executive

authorities.

The Minister’s working day begins with a meeting with the ___________

__ (14) who briefly informs him about the latest developments in the world

according to reports from the foreign media. The _____________ (15) is a

comparatively young subdivi sion of the Ministry, as it started its activities

in 1999, when the Information Department was reorganized. Main tasks of

the Press Service lie in meeting infor mation needs of Ukrainian and foreign

communities concerning both foreign policy activities of Ukraine and dayto-

day work of the MFA. The service also works closely with representatives

of Ukrainian and foreign media. The Press Service prepares and disseminates

official messages of the MFA, holds weekly briefings, ar ranges

media coverage of visits by foreign officials to our country, as well the MFA

leadership’s visits abroad. If necessary, this office creates and supports activities

of field press centers, makes arrangements for interviews and publications

of the Ministry’s leader ship, and also accredits representatives of

foreign media in Ukraine and assists them in their work.

The _____________ (16), opened in 2001 at the MFA, has become a qualitatively

new form of communication with media representatives. Outfitted

with modern office equipment, including computers, the Club provides an

inviting and infor mal setting where journalists can meet with Ukrai nian

and foreign diplomats conduct interviews or work on their stories. The

Press Club gallery hosts a permanent exhibition of works of contemporary

Ukrainian artists and sculp tors. Another important event in the Ministry’s communi cations efforts was the launch of its redesigned Website. The Press

Service continuously adds information to the Website and works to improve

its usability and visual attractiveness. From the MFA’s Website pages Internet

users get information on the current activities of the Ministry, learn

about the development of our country’s diplomatic relations with foreign

states and obtain data relating to consular and legal issues.

The Minister directly oversees three other subdivi sions, which perform

functions related to several special tasks and responsibilities: the _____

________ (17); the ____________ (18) (protection of information), and

_____________ (19) (oversight of Ukrainian missions abroad).

4. Go back to exercises 1 and 2. Can you answer the questions now?

5. Find in the text the words meaning:

1. Cучасна структура Міністерства закордонних справ; 2. викристалі-

зуватися в результаті реформи; 3. внаслідок значних структурних змін;

4. організація діяльності зовнішньополітичного відомства; 5. впритул

наблизитися до класичних європейських зразків; 6. департаменти,

що об’єднують понад тридцять управлінь; 7. запроваджувати посади;

8. Державний секретар; 9. Державний секретар з питань Європейської

інтеграції; 10. заступник; 11. стабільність і збалансованість; 12. забез-

печувати роботу; 13. ефективно реагувати; 14. сучасні проблеми та за-

грози; 15. Кабінет (патронатна служба) Міністра закордонних справ;

16. володіти іноземними мовами; 17. мати за плечима довгостроко-

ві закордонні відрядження; 18. готувати і опрацьовувати матеріали;

19. зустрічі і переговори за участю Міністра; 20. контролювати процес

виконання доручень та вказівок; 21. подавати на підпис; 22. Центр опе-

ративного реагування (ЦОР); 23. створювати структуру; 24. з метою

підвищення ефективності реагування; 25. події у світі; 26. моніторинг

кризових та надзвичайних ситуацій; 27. забезпечення швидкого і ді-

євого захисту прав та інтересів українських громадян за кордоном;

28. працювати цілодобово; 29. декілька разів на добу; 30. готувати опе-

ративні повідомлення; 31. найсвіжіші міжнародні події; 32. вивчати

повідомлення зарубіжних ЗМІ; 33. аналізувати інформацію; 34. дипло-

матичні та консульські установи; 35. тісна координація; 36. відповід-

ні підрозділи; 37. Міністерство оборони; 38. Міністерство внутрішніх

справ; 39. Міністерство з надзвичайних ситуацій; 40. Служби без-

пеки; 41. державні структури; 42. діяльність Міністра; 43. бути тісно пов’язаним; 44. Управління державного протоколу; 45. найбільш від-

повідальний; 46. відповідати за підготовку і здійснення зарубіжних ві-

зитів урядових делегацій; 47. на чолі з главою зовнішньополітичного

відомства; 48. протокольні служби Президента, Кабінету Міністрів та

Верховної Ради України; 49. питання прийому іноземних делегацій;

50. робочі контакти Міністерства; 51. листування; 52. іноземні дипло-

матичні представництва, акредитовані в Україні; 53. акредитація пред-

ставників зарубіжного дипломатичного корпусу; 54. захист привілеїв

та імунітетів іноземних дипломатів та дипломатичних представництв;

55. протокольне забезпечення; 56. церемонія вручення іноземними

послами копій вірчих грамот Міністру та вірчих грамот Президенту;

57. вручення екзекватур іноземним почесним консулам; 58. сприяти в

організації зустрічей; 59. керівники іноземних дипломатичних пред-

ставництв; 60. високі посадові особи; України, 61. на рівні Міністра;

62. керівники виконавчих гілок влади; 63. Прес-служба; 64. керівник

Прес-служби; 65. проводити брифінги; 66. останні події у світі; 67. за

повідомленнями зарубіжних ЗМІ; 68. порівняно молоде управління;

69. реорганізація Управління інформації; 70. головне завдання; 71. за-

доволення інформаційних потреб; 72. зарубіжна громадськість; 73. по-

всякденна робота; 74. співпраця з українськими та іноземними засоба-

ми масової інформації; 75. готувати і розповсюджувати офіційні пові-

домлення МЗС; 76. проводити щотижневі брифінги; 77. організовува-

ти висвітлення в ЗМІ; 78. візити офіційних представників зарубіжних

країн; 79. створювати та забезпечувати роботу виїзних прес-центрів;

80. організовувати публікації та інтерв’ю; 81. акредитувати та сприяти

роботі мас-медіа; 82. якісно нова форма спілкування з представника-

ми ЗМІ; 83. Прес-клуб; 84. оснащений оргтехнікою; 85. невимушена

атмосфера; 85. спілкуватися з дипломатами; 86. опрацьовувати інфор-

маційні матеріали; 87. експонувати виставки; 88. оновлений веб-сайт;

89. робота з інформаційного наповнення; 90. поточна робота МЗС;

91.безпосередньо підпорядковуватися; 92. виконувати специфічні

функції; 93. виконанням особливих завдань і доручень; 94. Управління

Послів з особливих доручень та Головних радників; 95. захистом ін-

формації; 96. Перший відділ; 97. контроль за діяльністю закордонних

установ; 98. Генеральна інспекція.

6. Fill in the blanks in the sentences below with the English equivalents

of the words and word-combinations from exercise 5.

1. The present structure of the Ministry is a result of the reform ______

______ in 2001. 2. Following major changes, the methods of work of the

Ukrain ian foreign policy ____________ now ____________ European

models. 3. The Ministry has six ____________incorporating more than

thirty ____________. 4. The Ministry is dynamic and balanced, which ensures

functioning of the foreign policy ____________ of Ukraine. 5. The

Ministry ____________ rapidly and efficiently to the present-day ______

______ and threats. 6. The Ministry is ____________ by the Minister with

assistance of the ____________ Secretary, State Secretary for European

____________ and ____________ of State Secretary. 7. Minister’s Private

____________ supports Minister’s day-to-day work. 8. The average age of

____________in the Office is rather low. 9. All of them have had ________

____ of a long-term mission abroad. 10. The Office ____________ and prepares

materials for meetings and ____________ with the Minister’s participation.

11. The Office oversees the process of ____________ the Minister’s

decisions and instructions. 12. Hundreds of documents are ____________

for the Minister’s signature. 13. Rapid ____________ Center operates under

the Minister’s ____________Office. 13.This Center allows effective Ministry’s

response to ____________ events. 14. The Center also provides for

the ____________ of crises and emergencies. 15. The Center is responsible

for effective ____________ of the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens

abroad. 16. The Rapid Response Center prepares ____________ reports on

the latest international ____________. 17. This Center studies latest news

reports by the world ____________ and analyses data from ____________

and diplomatic missions abroad. 18. The State ____________Department

is considered one of the most responsible structures in any foreign policy

service. 19. The Department prepares foreign visits of Ukrainian _______

_____del egations headed by the Foreign Minister. 20. The State Protocol

Department maintains the working ____________and correspondence with

foreign diplomatic ____________accredited in Ukraine. 21. The Department

takes care of ____________ of representatives of foreign diplomatic

corps. 22. The State Protocol Department is also responsible for the protection

of privileges and____________of foreign diplomats and missions. 23. The

Department provides protocol support for the pre sentation of ________

____to the President and the pre sentation of copies of credentials to the

Minister by foreign ____________ and the granting of ____________ to

foreign honorary ____________. 24. The Department organizes meetings

of heads of foreign ____________ missions with high-ranking Ukrainian

_____________. 25. The Head of the ____________Service informs the Minister

about the latest world ____________. 26. The Press Service is a comparatively

young ____________ of the Ministry. 27. The main task of the

Press Service is ____________infor mation needs of Ukrainian and foreign

communities. 28. The Press Service prepares and ____________ official

messages of the Ministry. 29. The Press Service creates and supports work

of field ____________centers. 30. The ____________ Club is outfitted with

modern office equipment. 31. From the MFA’s Website pages Internet users

get information on the ____________ activities of the Ministry. 32. The

Minister directly ____________ three subdivi sions, related to several special

responsibilities: the Department of ____________ at-Large and Chief

Advisors; the ____________Department (protection of information), and

____________ General (oversight of Ukrainian missions abroad).

7. Work in pairs. Reproduce the texts about the structure of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs to your partner. Use the headlines below as the

backbone for your story.

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine: General Background

2. The Minister and His Private Office

3. The Rapid Response Center

4. The State Protocol Department

5. The Press Service

6. The Press Club and MFA’s Website

7. Subdivi sions with Special Tasks and Responsibilities

9. Read the texts (adapted from the articles by Viktor ZAMYATIN in

The Day of January 20 and April 27, 2004) and compare the aims and

spheres of Ukraine’s cooperation Euro-Atlantic countries and Russia.

Diplomatic Reconnaissance

The aim of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko’s recent

negotiations in Brussels with new NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer and EC Commissioner G Я nter Verheugen is an open secret. First,

Hryshchenko went to meet the new NATO Secretary General in person. Second,

he attempted to find out what Ukraine can count on during the NATO

Summit in Istanbul next May and negotiations on the Ukraine-EU Action

Plan that will begin shortly. Third, of late Western diplomats have been saying

openly that they find it difficult to understand what is now happening

in Ukraine. The foreign minister found himself in a difficult situation: he is

required to explain something that cannot be explained using plain logic and

make sure Ukraine continues its gradual movement toward Europe or at least

avoids drifting away from it. In any case, thus far it seems that Kyiv still

has a chance to be heard, but diplomacy has increasingly fewer possibilities

for objective reasons.

The first part of Hryshchenko’s European tour, a visit to London, could

perhaps be considered quite successful. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw

yet again thanked Ukraine for its contribution to the peacekeeping effort in

Iraq (last week came reports that Ukrainian peacekeepers managed to quell

public unrest). According to news reports, Straw stressed the role of the Ukrainian

force in ensuring stability in the zone of its responsibility in Iraq. He

also assured Hryshchenko of Britain’s support for Ukraine’s participation in

the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. It will be recalled that several Ukrainian

companies have been registered for participation in reconstruction projects

that will be run by US companies.

Jack Straw also wished Ukraine success in its European and Euro-Atlantic

aspirations. Apparently, this will prove more difficult. Despite the fact that

Great Britain has in recent years expressed sincere support for Ukraine’s

intentions to join the EU and NATO, and down the road London might even

become Kyiv’s lobbyist, this requires certain commitments by Ukraine. We

are reminded of this at each meeting, forum, and international conference.

In particular, in London Donald Anderson, chairman of the House of

Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, told Minister Hryshchenko that Ukraine’s

European aspirations should be realized by means of implementing

reforms. Diplomats, lawmakers, and experts are more straightforward in unofficial

discussions: it is time to decide what Ukraine really needs — to risk

another period of isolation or finally implement fundamental reforms.

As for the future action plan, much remains unclear for various reasons. The

European Commission, whose representatives are negotiating with Ukraine,

is not authorized to make political decisions, that is, to determine the ultimate

goal of this plan. So far it is only clear that the document will be binding

on both sides and drafted based on the results of bilateral negotiations. In their

interviews with The Day, EC Commissioners Verheugen and Patten pointed

out that the document should bring Ukraine closer to the four freedoms

of the EU. It should contain certain stages, by fulfilling which Ukraine will

continue its progress in its relationship with the enlarged EU. However, it is

not stated anywhere nor will it be stated that after fulfilling this plan Ukraine

will have a chance to be recognized as a prospective EU member. Precisely

this issue is avoided now in the EU and with good reason.

First, it will be years before the consequences of the first large-scale EU enlargement

can be seen. Second, many in the West point to the fact that no political

decisions regarding Ukraine will be made until it becomes clear which

way the country is developing, where its major policy vector is headed, and

how its words translate into deeds. So far the West shows a lack of understanding

for the processes underway in Ukraine. Kyiv insists, however, that

the recent push to create a Single Economic Space has in turn resulted in an

attempt to advance economic relations between Ukraine and the EU.

What concerns the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, much will also

depend on the general political processes in Ukraine and not merely the presidential

elections of 2004. American diplomats pointed to this quite openly,

although Washington simultaneously says its aim is to promote Ukraine’s

accession to the alliance. Ukraine hopes to be included in the Membership

Action Plan during the NATO Summit in Istanbul. Yet no NATO member is

promising that this will happen. They only say that everything will depend

on the assessment of Ukraine’s progress in fulfilling the Action Plan and Target

Plan of 2003, Ukraine’s defense reform, and, most importantly, democratic

processes in the country. The latter poses major problems for Ukraine,

and it will be very difficult to convince NATO states otherwise, especially

considering the fact that there are not too many countries lobbying for Ukraine’s

accession. In particular, nobody is hiding the fact that Ukraine will

have to exert itself to win the support of such countries as France, Spain, and

Germany. Incidentally, recently Germany’s Defense Minister Peter Struck

told an international conference that Russia will certainly join NATO, while

Moscow says it has no such plans. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s membership is not

even discussed as yet.

On the other hand, all this looks like only the beginning of a process that

could have started years ago under different conditions. At least prospects

of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration are received seriously

in the West and gradually begin to be discussed. Obviously, this process will

take more than one year and will see many teams of politicians and diplomats

replace one another on either side. The road that lies ahead of Ukraine will

undoubtedly be more difficult than the road taken by Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic. And yet this is not the highest possible price Ukraine

could have to pay. Sooner or later we will have to make serious decisions

about our relationship with Russia and the possibilities that will appear in

the west, east, north, and south.

The results of Minister Hryshchenko’s visit will not be negative provided

Ukraine does not pose as a faithful disciple of Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.

Incidentally, the latter countries face no major criticism precisely

because of the openness of their positions. Moreover, there might be no

other Iraqi opportunity for Ukraine.

Presenting the New Face of Russian Diplomacy

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spent less than a day in Kyiv before

flying on to Dublin. The official results of his talks with Ukrainian counterpart

Kostiantyn Hryshchenko and meeting with President Kuchma are

as follows: the parties have discussed the issues of coordinating the ratification

of international agreements and transferring to Ukraine part of former

Soviet real estate properties abroad, along with international security

issues and the situation in Iraq (at this moment reports came of the release

of Ukrainian hostages who worked in Iraq under contracts with a Russian

company). Aside from these official results, the talks were essentially a presentation

of Putin’s new foreign policy.

The only public statement by Minister Lavrov during the Kyiv talks that

deserves special note is that the sides have agreed that the whole range of

issues on common European security, including relations with NATO, will

be solved by Kyiv and Moscow transparently, based on mutual notifications,

consultations, and coordination. Lavrov’s multilevel and abstruse statement

was accompanied by a thesis to the effect that “episodes will not affect the

[Russo-Ukrainian] relationship.” By episodes he meant the memorandum

recently ratified by Verkhovna Rada, which allows NATO forces quick access

to Ukrainian territory for international exercises. This decision was not

well received in Moscow, with Russian diplomats and military top brass

stating that such a move by Kyiv goes beyond the bounds of Russo-Ukrainian

partnership. According to Hryshchenko, during the Kyiv talks the ministers

reached “complete understanding of the fact that despite all our similar

approaches to many international policy issues, there are issues that we

103

see differently.” Hryshchenko believes that this is neither a tragedy nor an

obstacle for the development of the relationship.

Thus, caution and rigidity is the first thing that Lavrov has demonstrated

not so much to his long-time colleague Hryshchenko (the two go back to

the time of Lavrov’s permanent representation of Russia in the UN) as to

the public at large. After nine and a half years in New York and his stint

as deputy of Russia’s pro-American Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Lavrov is

versed in the flows and currents of the international politics, is familiar

with policy architects in the leading countries, and is proficient at using

the instruments of the diplomatic and legal casuistry. Lavrov’s record also

includes the pacification process in the Balkans (ending the war in Bosnia

and signing the Dayton Peace Accord; the Kosovo crisis and the signing of

the peace agreement), handling the 9/11 crisis, and the Iraqi crisis. There are

also more recent examples such as his direct involvement in the handling of

the Ajaria crisis.

Lavrov promises a consistent foreign policy and states (in an article carried

in The Wall Street Journal) that Russia is a powerful country with its

own interests to protect. In this article he refers to the former USSR as a

“zone of vital interests” for Russia and describes the main course of Russia’s

policy in this region as the “development of integration.” President

Vladimir Putin made a similar statement in his first news conference after

reelection. Ukraine was not mentioned in either case, which prompts the

conclusion that, while Moscow considers the US, EU, Japan, and China as

its equals in the arena of international politics, the CIS is rather a “space,”

in which it can play according to its own rules. Obviously, in its talks with

the world’s leading players Moscow, represented by Lavrov, will continue to

assert its rights to dictate its own rules of the game in this region.

“There is no place for empire” — such is the gist of the first several messages

of Minister Lavrov. Indeed, the empire in the old sense or even a liberal

empire is not discussed anymore. What exactly is discussed will become

known soon. Quite probably, Lavrov’s visit to Kyiv, which could not be

other than a get-acquainted visit for both sides, will change something in

the approach to events in neighboring countries. Russia has already suffered

the consequences of its traditional approach in Georgia. Obviously, Russia’s

attitude toward the elections in Ukraine and its relations with the Ukrainian

elite will require adjustment on both sides of the border, which might result

from Lavrov’s first visit and future contacts. Lavrov is characterized as an inflexible and assertive diplomat, and could be expected to instruct his

subordinates to get the Ukrainian leadership to ratify as soon as possible

the agreements on the creation of the Single Economic Space and on the

status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Obviously, given the possibility

of a change in power and ruling elites in Kyiv, the ratification by

Verkhovna Rada of these documents, which are crucial for Moscow, could

be stalled indefinitely, the more so that Ukraine is yet to see the benefits of

joining the SES, while the agreement on the joint use of the Sea of Azov

hastily signed by Presidents Kuchma and Putin is debated in both Kyiv and

Moscow. Moreover, it is quite possible that with a change in the ruling elites

the issues and problems in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship could be no

longer solved by the presidents and their confidants behind closed doors.

10. Write a 300-word essay on the structure of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the functions of the Foreign Minister and his Office.