1.2.2. Secured Transactions
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As tar as secured transactions are concerned, the relevance of insolvency effects for
the parties and the causal link required are established by the nature of the transaction.
It is the risk of default of the debtor, and in particular in the event of the debtor's
insolvency, for which security interests are granted. '* The degree of protection afforded
by the security interest and the consideration given for it therefore have (at the least
potential) consequences for the decision by parties to enter into a transaction.
The Court's judgment in Knintz should not be regarded as conclusive on this point.
The issue before the Court in Krautz can be distinguished from the present question.
the tact that it concerns an unsecured transaction alone, it does not necessarily follow
that insolvency effects are irrelevant and that universal application of the lex fori
concursus does not result in an obstacle to trade. Some creditors are in fact in no
position to demand security. Nevertheless, their position in the event of insolvency
- the way their pre-insolvency entitlements are affected by insolvency law or the level
of protection provided for - could arguably be relevant for a transaction and thus the
freedoms.
This, at least, appears to be the position reflected in secondary Community law. For
instance, in the preamble of Council Directive 9 0 / 3 1 4 on package travel it is stated that
disparities in the rules protecting the consumers are a 'disincentive to consumers in
one Member State from buying packages in another Member State'. " The Directive
continues to include rules relating to the protection of the consumer against the insolvency
of the organiser/" In other words, the Directive assumes that disparities in the
treatment in insolvency of unsecured transactions may result in an obstacle to the free
movement of services. Similarly, Directive 8 0 / 9 8 7 on the protection of employees in
the event of the insolvency of the employer assumes that the free movement of workers
maybe affected by differences in the treatment of claims arising from employment
relationships in insolvency.1 1 Though neither Directive concerns the effects of
insolvency law in the strict sense, they are nevertheless based on the premise that the
risk of insolvency is relevant to unsecured transactions and thus to the freedoms.'
Both the package-travel consumer and the employee distinguish themselves from the
general unsecured creditor. The package-travel Directive notes that the disincentive
the rules at issue may well cause the contracting parties to incur additional costs,
by requiring them, purely for the purposes of registering the mortgage, to value
the debt in the national currency and, as the case may be, formally to record that
currency conversion.: 1
The restrictive effect of the Austrian rule was thus two-fold. On the one hand it
reduced the effectiveness of the security right, on the other, it lead to additional costs
tor the parties concerned. Considering the absence of a de minimis for the restrictive
effect, it is submitted, either one of these two grounds alone would have justified the
conclusion that the rule constituted an obstacle to the free movement of capital.
As pointed out above, the principal consequences of the universal application of the
lex fori concursus consist of both a reduction of effectiveness of security rights and
additional costs for the parties.:" Consequently, it would reduce the attractiveness of
security rights and therefore burden the transaction to which it is ancillary. Although
'['rummer ami Mayer concerned the free movement of capital and a mortgage as a
'traditional security right', the Court's judgment has much wider ramifications. The
Court's reasoning is equally applicable in those instances where a security right was
granted to secure payment of goods sold in the exercise of the free movement of
goods. Secondly, it should not matter for the freedoms whether parties use the
'classic' method of securing a debt or employ a less traditional security right. Indeed,
it is arguable that it extends beyond security rights in rem and would cover contractual
((/; personam) security, such as bank guarantees or set-off, as well.