CHAPTER TWO PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY AND THE STRUGGLE OVER JURISDICTION
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
I N T R O D U C T I ON
Cross-border insolvency as a t e rm denotes those situations in which a debtor's assets
and/or liabilities are located in more than one jurisdiction, or where the debtor's
circumstances are such that s/he is subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states.
Even at a basic level, cross-border insolvency confronts states with various choices.
States have to decide under what circumstances they are willing to exercise jurisdiction;
i f so, what position they should take regarding that part of the debtor's estate which
is situated beyond their territorial limits; whether they should take control over those
assets and liabilities; and, if so, what law to apply. Conversely, other jurisdictions will
have to decide how to respond to proceedings commenced abroad; whether and under
what conditions they will recognise insolvency proceedings opened abroad; and, if
so, what the consequences of recognition are.
Traditionally, most of these questions have been addressed by reference to the dogmatic
principles of universality and its conceptual counter-part, territoriality. The
former, at least in its strict form, means that insolvency proceedings opened in one
state take effect everywhere, covering all assets and liabilities of the debtor wherever
they are located. The l a t t e r - t h e principle of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y - i s shorthand for a situation
where the effects of insolvency proceedings are limited to the territory oi the insolvency
forum.
Nowadays it is generally accepted that both principles are too extreme, and that neither
presents a realistic option for states. Indeed, the reduction of the cross-border insolvency
dilemma to a territoriality-universality dichotomy has prevented rather than
stimulated the emergence of effective cross-border insolvency regulation. In the words
of Nadelmann: 'The old dogmatic controversy in the civil law between those who
declare bankruptcy 'single and universal' and the others who hold it 'multiple and territorial' has had but little effect internationally on the .solution ot the problem'.
In the bifocal world of territoriality and universality, states have found themselves
locked in a 'struggle over jurisdiction'.
In contrast, modern cross-border insolvency regulation is no longer pre-occupied with
taking an absolute stance on either one of these principles. Instead, its task is the
formulation of structures which enable legislators, courts and practitioners to reconcile
the various opposing interests underlying the principles of territoriality and universality.
Rather than by'principles' and 'struggle', modern cross-border insolvency regulation
may be characterised by 'pragmatism' and 'co-operation'.
The move from principles to pragmatism, from struggle to co-operation in crossborder
insolvency regulation forms the subject of the f i r s t section of this book. Modern
cross-border regulation is discussed in the second chapter. The current chapter seeks
to provide insights into the basic structure of the cross-border insolvency dilemma.
Although the above-mentioned principles may have lost much of their significance
in modern cross-border insolvency regulation, that regulation has nonetheless
developed against the background of these traditional notions.' They therefore remain
convenient tools with which to initially outline the structure of t he cross-border insolvency
dilemma. As will become clear during the course of this chapter, a 'struggle over
jurisdiction' is the natural state of affairs when universality and territoriality are the
only two alternatives thought available for the regulation ot cross-border insolvency.