1.3.4. Keck and Private International Law
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So tar an unqualified reading of the Court's ruling in Dassonvilk has been the startingpoint
of analysis: 'all measures capable of hindering intra-Community trade' are prohibited
unless they are justified by overriding public interests. In particular, no account
has been taken of the Court's judgment in Keck and Mithouard."' In its judgment in
Keck the Court introduced a distinction between national rules concerning product
requirements and those prohibiting or restricting'certain selling-arrangements'. With
respect to this latter category the Court held that 'contrary to what has previously been
decided' those rules fall outside the scope of Article 28 F.C provided that they 'apply
to all traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in
the same manner in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those
of other Member States."
Keck has produced a wealth of literature, which does not need to be reproduced here."
What should be pointed out, however, is that the ramifications of the Keck judgment
for the control of Community law over national private international law are limited. '"
This is first of all due to the fact that the exception introduced in Keck appears to be
particular to the free movement of goods and Article 28 F.C. At least the Court has not
extended its ruling to any of the other economic freedoms, though it arguably had
ample opportunity to do so.'" Also in respect of Article 28 F.C, the implications of Keck
should not be overstated. The judgment has not affected the effects based approach
ot Dnssonvillc. Also after Keck it is not the form of a national measure but the effects
ot its application that matters under Article 28 FC."
The distinction the Court draws between rules relating to product requirements and
selling arrangements is therefore ot limited consequence. Rules relating to product
requirements are 'by nature such to hinder intra-Community trade'.' They force
foreign products to comply with two sets of regulations and therefore do not affect
domestic and foreign products alike. Consequently, also where selling-arrangements
form an integral part of the product itself (packaging; puzzles in magazines), rules
relating to those selling-arrangements are treated on the same footing.' Otherwise,
rules prohibiting or restricting certain selling arrangements, even if indistinctly
applicable, may or may not hinder interstate trade, depending on whether they 'attect
in the same manner in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and ot
those of other Member States'."' Thus the Court's p r e -Keck cases of Huct, GB-INNOHM,
()o<thock i\nd Yves Rochcr, in which national rules relating to selling arrangements
resulted in obstacles to trade as they prevented foreign traders from formulating a
uniform marketing strategy and from benefiting from economies of scale, would not
now escape the prohibition ot Article 28 FC." The application of such rules did not
and still does not affect the marketing of domestic and foreign products in the same
manner.'" Conversely, the measures at issue in Keck and its follow ups Hi'mermund
and Taiikstntioii 7 Heukske" fell outside Article 28 FC, not because they were sellingarrangements
applying equally in law and in fact, but because they were equally
applicable measures not impeding market-access nor obstructing the realisation ot
economies ot scale and wider consumer choice in an integrating market.""
If Keck has not overturned the effects-based approach of Dossimville, the implications
for Community law's control over national private international law remain limited.'1 ''
To exclude a national measure by virtue ot Keck, it must be established that a measure
prohibiting or restricting a selling-arrangement imposes an equal burden on the marketing
of domestic and foreign products. As Von Wilmowsky correctly points out,
this condition will rarely, if ever, be fulfilled in respect of rules of private international
law. " L'nlike cross-border transactions, the marketing of domestic products by domestic
traders is not confronted by the additional costs of conflicts of law. In other
the national measure may still be justified on the grounds of overriding interests other
than those expressly provided for in the EC Treatv.