3. A NEW PARADIGM OF MODERN CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY REGULATION: REGULATION THROUGH CO-OPERATION
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In the introduction to this chapter, reference was made to Balz, who noted that the
universality-territoriality dichotomy had nearly lost its meaning. In light of the
approaches to cross-border insolvency discussed above, the traditional principles
would indeed appear to be of little use either as normative or descriptive tools. For
instance, while LoPucki regards 'territoriality [as a] foundation for ( . . . ) mutually
beneficial cooperation', Unt states with equal conviction that 'territoriality ( . . . ) is the
inverse of co-operation'. 11 Admittedly, territorial elements remain part of all the
approaches discussed; none of t h em accept the universal effect of foreign proceedings.
However, it is equally true to say that they reject the very idea of territoriality, being
based on the assumption that cross-border insolvencies require collective and coordinated,
not fragmented, efforts. For similar reasons terms such as 'modified' or 'limited' universality are unsatisfactory.'"s These terms do little more than indicate
a position somewhere in between the two extremes of the principles of universality
and territoriality. They tail to capture the essence of modern cross-border insolvency
regulation, which is the accommodation of and reliance on co-operation.