CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
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Insolvency is a fact of ( e c o n o m i c ) lite. People and businesses accept risks in order to
make a profit. If t o o many of these risks materialise, however, people may become
unable to pay all of their debts as they fall due. In such instances legal systems usually
make available insolvency proceedings. One thing these procedures have in c o m m on
is that they are collective proceedings: so as to prevent the chaos and inequity that
would result from individual creditors seeking to collect on their debt; and, where
possible, to enable rehabilitation of the debtor.
In international (economic) life, the chances are that people and businesses have assets
and/or liabilities in more than one state. If insolvency occurs in this case, the same
collectivity cannot be attained by a single state alone. States are generally unable to
control assets and restrain creditor and debtor behaviour in the territory of another
state. The necessary degree of" collectivity then depends on the willingness of those
other states to enforce the collectivity in their own territory. Historically, such
willingness has been lacking. The result: exactly the ineffective procedures with
inequitable and unpredictable outcomes which insolvency law is designed to prevent.
Without too much difficulty, cross-border insolvency and the problems it raises can
be traced back to medieval times. The downfall of the Ammanati Bank of Pistoia in
the year 1302 is a well known example. With offices, debtors and creditors all over
Western Europe, it was thanks to the efforts of pope Bonafacius V I I I , as a sovereign
not bound by worldly frontiers, that many of the assets could be transferred to Rome
allowing for an even distribution: a sub-divine intervention with a reasonable result.
Throughout history there have been other favourable exceptions but it is only fair to
say that as a rule cross-border insolvency has proven a particularly difficult problem
that states have been unable or unwilling to address in a satisfactory fashion. Thus,
nearly seven centuries after the collapse of the Ammanati Bank, Westbrook could still
rightly claim that the existing lack of effective regulation ot cross-border insolvency stands in the way of'regional economic integration' and 'transnational enterprise
generally'.-
The states that embarked on the project of European economic integration did,
however, acknowledge the intimate relationship between (cross-border) trade and
(cross-border) insolvency. Work on a European Convention on Bankruptcy, Windingup,
Arrangements, Compositions and similar Proceedings began soon after the
establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958.'Nevertheless, i t t o ok
the Member States another thirty-five years to agree on a common framework to deal
with cross-border insolvencies and it was not until 31 May 2002 that Council
Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings entered into force.1 The adoption
and entry into force o f Council Regulation 1346/2000 i s of considerable significance,
both in terms of (the history of) cross-border insolvency regulation as well as the
process of European integration.
The regulation of cross-border insolvencies in the European Union forms the central
focus of this book. To be more specific, this book presents an analysis of the crossborder
insolvency regime introduced by Council Regulation 1 3 4 6 / 2 0 0 0 on insolvency
proceedings from two wider perspectives: that of international cross-border insolvency
regulation and that of the internal market and Community law.
For thirty out of thirty five years, the attempts of the Member States to come to a
common cross-border insolvency regime were guided by the so-called ideal of 'unity
and universality' of insolvency. Proceedings opened in one Member State should
operate in all other Member States. The end result of Regulation 1 3 4 6 / 2 0 0 0 , however,
is a system in which cross-border insolvency proceedings are to be regulated through
a combination and co-ordination of (universal) main and (territorial) secondary
proceedings that simultaneously take place in several Member States.
This choice for a more pragmatic approach is certainly not unique to European efforts
in the field of cross-border insolvency regulation. It forms part of a much wider
tendency at the global level which has been gaining momentum for more than twenty
years and continues to do so. Instead of a commitment to one of the traditional
principles of universality or territoriality, academic debate as well as court practice
and legislative reforms have moved towards reliance on and accommodation of cooperation
between the various jurisdictions involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings. Internationally, co-operation has become the new paradigm of crossborder
insolvency regulation.
The regime introduced by Regulation 1346/2000 must be understood in the light of
this new paradigm of modern cross-border insolvency regulation that has emerged
at the international level, o u t s i d e o f the Community context. The nature of this paradigm
illustrates that within the Regulation's overall approach, co-operation between
the various proceedings is the key mechanism. The extent to which co-operation has
been accommodated within the Regulation's framework determines whether and to
what extent the Regulation may indeed achieve its stated objective of ensuring that
within the internal market, cross-border insolvency proceedings operate 'efficiently
and effectively'.'
There are however differences between the international context, in which the cooperative
paradigm of modern cross-border insolvency regulation has developed, and
that ot the European Community/Union, in which the Regulation has been introduced.
It the absence ot effective cross-border insolvency regulation hinders 'regional
economic integration'and'transnational enterprise generally'at the international level,
then this must be even more true at the Community level. This is not just a matter
of degree - it also has constitutional dimensions. Under public international law
individual states are free to balance their local and multi-state interests as they see fit.
States are under no obligation to exercise their 'conflicts freedom' in order to promote
economic integration or international commerce. Whereas this in general terms is true
in the case of public international law, it certainly is not true in the case of European
Community law. Viewed from a Community law perspective Westbrook's observation
acquires a crucial connotation. Essentially, it brings the regulation of cross-border
insolvencies within the scope of Community law and the principle of supremacy.
Integration and economic growth in the broad sense have been, and still are, the core
objectives of the Community.1 , It is exactly for these purposes that Member States have
transferred part of their sovereignty, creating an autonomous legal order.
Remarkably enough, however, Community law has played no more than a marginal
role in the process leading up to Regulation 1346/2000. In fact, until the Treaty of
Amsterdam, negotiations took place within the intergovernmental framework of
Article 293 EC and not the supranational framework of the Community. And although
the preamble dutifully proclaims that' [ t ] he proper functioning of the internal market requires that cross-border insolvency proceedings should operate efficiently and
effectively', this appears to be little more than an all too familiar dictum, intended to
bring the legislative powers of the Community into position.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Community law is (or has ever been) neutral regarding
the regulation of cross-border insolvency between the Member States. In its judgment
in Dankmarks Aktive Handekrejsende the Court of Justice observed that Community
law 'guarantees freedom of movement ( . . . ) within the Community and thus encourages
situations involving ( . . . ) foreign e l e m e n t s ' / Conversely, where national law discourages
parties to create such international situations this may hinder the exercise of the
freedoms. As early as 1977 Fletcher observed that
the disparities between the laws of the nine Member States, including their rules
on private international law, in relation to bankruptcy pose ominous difficulties,
and there is the ever-present threat o f ' d i s t o r t i on in economic relationships'- that
arch-villain of Community law demonology."
These 'difficulties' do not only make themselves felt after the opening of insolvency
proceedings. The expectation and prospect of unpredictable, wasteful and unfair
proceedings in the event of insolvency may also affect the willingness of private parties
to enter into a cross-border transaction in the first place. I n other words, rules of crossborder
insolvency may result in obstacles to interstate trade, and these are in principle
only allowed under strict conditions of Community law.
It is this Community law dimension that will be further explored in this work, as it
seeks to show that, if taken seriously, primary Community law would have been and
i s quite capable of generating the essential building-blocks of an effective cross-border
insolvency regime. It may be noted at the outset that this is not merely an investigation
into what 'could have been'. Not only are there serious doubts as to the validity of
Regulation 1346/2000, but even if i t is assumed to be valid, the EC Treaty would be
an important source of principles to guide national courts (as well as the European
Court of Justice) in applying and interpreting the provisions of Council Regulation
1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. After all, i t is a general principle of Community
law that all secondary legislation should be interpreted in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, including those on free movement, and the general principles
of Community law.;"
S T R U C T U R E
The book i s divided into three sections. Section one analyses cross-border insolvency
regulation at the international level and the emergence of a paradigm of co-operation.
Section two deals with the interplay between Community law and the private international
law of the Member States and its relevance for cross-border insolvency law
as between the Member States. Section three presents an analysis of the background
to, and substance of, the Regulation on insolvency proceedings itself.
Section one describes and examines the regulation of cross-border insolvencies at the
international - as opposed to the Community - level and the emergence of the
paradigm of co-operation. It outlines the basic structure of the cross-border insolvency
dilemma and analyses modern responses to this dilemma. Traditionally the crossborder
insolvency discourse has been dominated by an 'all or nothing' attitude under
the principles of territoriality and universality. The reality of this bipolar world was
that each state sought to apply its own insolvency law and policy to the fullest extent
possible; a state of affairs which is aptly characterised as a 'struggle over jurisdiction'
(chapter o n e ) . Modern responses to cross-border insolvency are no longer formulated
by reference to either principle. Instead, modern cross-border insolvency regulation
seeks to arrive at fair and efficient proceedings through co-operation between
jurisdictions. 'Co-operation between jurisdictions' has become the new paradigm of
modern cross-border insolvency regulation (chapter two).
After discussing the wider international context of Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency
proceedings, section two examines cross-border insolvency in the light of Community
law. In order to assess the lawfulness of t he principles of universality and territoriality
of insolvency under Community law, the general interplay between Community law
and national private international law of the Member States will be elaborated (chapter
three). Community law has, in the process of integrating national markets into a
common market, generated a comitas Europaea, limiting Member States' autonomy
in respect of private international law generally. Under this comitas Member Sates are
no longer tree to apply their rules of (private international) law to relationships arising
in the exercise of one ot the freedoms. Moreover, this comitas also instructs Member
States when confronted with the foreign (mandatory) rules ot law of sister Member
States. The comiuis F.uropoco therefore presents a convenient framework to examine
the application of insolvency law under the principle of universality (chapter four)
as well as the non-application of foreign insolvency law under the principle of
territoriality (chapter five).
Council Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings itself is discussed in detail
in section three. In addition to an examination of the legal basis and substance of the
Regulation (chapter 7 ) , due attention will also be paid to the Regulation's background
(chapter 6 ) . This includes, on the one hand, the drafting history, reflecting the fact
that the Regulation builds on the paradigm of co-operation developed outside the
Community context; and, on the other hand, the choice of the Member States to
harmonise their cross-border insolvency laws but to leave their substantive insolvency
laws largely untouched. The experience of federal states - as illustrated by the United
States - strongly suggests that Regulation 1 3 4 6 / 2 0 0 0 remains an accomplishment of
modest proportions, likely to be of a transitory nature.
L I M I T S A N n T E R M I N O L O GY
The following analysis will in principle be limited to business insolvency (whether the
business is run by a natural person or by a legal person) with the exclusion of consumer
insolvency. This is not to say that consumer insolvency lacks a Community law
dimension, as the recent cases ot'Coursicr v Fortis and l)e Vleeschnwesters illustrate."
However, the developments at the international level predominantly address business
failure. Moreover, at the substantive level, the policies underlying the laws concerning
insolvency and debt-restructuring of businesses and consumers are sufficiently
different tor a choice for the former to be both appropriate and convenient.
Lastly, a few words on terminology are appropriate. From the above it may already
be clear that the use of'cross-border' is preferred over'international', and 'insolvency'
is preferred over 'bankruptcy'. As to the first, it is not only borders between sovereign
states that maybe problematic in the context of insolvency. Moreover, not all borders
between sovereign states are the same. Cross-border insolvencies may equally occur
at the national level. Historically, the United States is a good example; today, the