2 . 2 . ' F I R S T C O M E , F I R S T S E R V E D ' O R S H A R ED R E G U L A T O R Y R E S P O N S I B I L I TY
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
Community law does not make a choice in cases of concurrent and conflicting (exercise
o l ) regulatory jurisdiction. At the end of the day, such a situation of conflict of
laws presupposes that the regulatory measures of more than one Member State may
lawfully be applied. In particular, Community law does not allocate jurisdiction to
the Member State 'best placed to regulate matters' nor does it make a choice for 'the
least restrictive measure'.'1
In the context of cross-border insolvencies specifically, Von Wilmowsky has nevertheless
argued that Community law offers an (alternative) escape from these conflicts.
In matters ot deployment,1 " Community law and the duty of co-operation would
ensure unity of insolvency law and proceedings by forcing a choice between the conflicting
jurisdictions at the 'procedural stage'.' As, according to Von Wilmowsky,
Article 10 EC imposes a general duty on the Member States to apply each other's regulatory
measures, a maxim of'first come, first served' would dc facto determine which
Member State's law can lawfully be applied: the f i r s t Member State to open insolvency
proceedings binds all other Member States as they are bound by Community law to
accord effect to that measure.1'
However, the duty to assist and co-operate under Article 10 EC cannot be understood
as requiring Member States unconditionally to accord effect to sister Member State
measures, particularly not in cases ot concurrent regulatory jurisdiction such as crossborder
insolvency.'" A Member State is required to provide the assistance requested,
unless il can show there to be 'imperative reasons' for not doing so. As Zwartvehl
illustrates this proviso extends beyond the narrow confines of the conflicts of law
concept ol public policy. Zwartveld suggests that the duty of mutual assistance and
co-operation in good faith is not such as to override the 'regulatory sovereignty' a
Member State enjoys within their own respective spheres of influence and responsibility.
" Consequently, to the extent that it would conflict with its own regulatory policy
lawfully pursued under Community law a Member State would be allowed to refuse
the assistance requested and to accord effect to the foreign insolvency' law and proceedings.
Provided it has regulatory jurisdiction, a Member State would be entitled
to take its own measures of deployment and/or distribution, which may include the
opening of domestic proceedings. Community law therefore allows for plurality of
forum and/or law.
Von Wilmowsky's suggestion of a 'first come, first served' solution appears in part
motivated by the assumption that unity of insolvency law is a sine qua non for the effective
deployment of a cross-border estate. ' However, neither plurality of law nor
plurality of forum means that efficient administration ot the debtor's estate is a priori
excluded." Modern cross-border insolvency regulation emphasises that also without
states unconditionally surrendering their 'regulatory sovereignty' to foreign insolvency
proceedings and law, effective regulation may be brought about through the use of
co-operative structures. It is submitted that the putting into place of such co-operative
structures is exactly what Community law requires Member States to do. Community
law may fail to resolve conflicts arising from (the exercise of) concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction by making a choice, but neither does it leave the Member States unaffected
in these instances. Member States remain bound by the duty of mutual assistance and
co-operation in good faith, which exists b o t h as a limitation on as well as an extension
of regulatory power. Cross-border insolvency regulation is a shared regulatory
responsibility for the Member States. 1 They must enter into sincere co-operation with
a view to mitigate burdens to interstate trade as well as with the aim to co-ordinate
and/or reconcile their conflicting regulatory choices.