3 . 1 . L A W O F D E P L O Y M E N T
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
In respect of deployment, extraterritoriality is evidently an appropriate measure.
Optimal deployment requires collectivity to resolve the common pool dilemma.
Consequently, to extend the proceedings so as to include all of the debtor's assets and
liabilities (the entire pool) wherever located is not just appropriate, it is also necessary;
there does not appear to be a less restrictive measure available.1
With regard to the universal application of the lex fori concursus (unity of law) it is
equally clear that it is an appropriate measure to protect the interest of optimal
deployment. However, it does not automatically follow that the universal application
of the lex fori conairsus should also be considered necessary for the purposes 01 the
law of t he freedoms. Arguably it would be less burdensome to interstate trade to apply
the lex concursus ot the Member State in which assets are located; or, more generally,
the lex concursus of the Member State whose law governs the individual debtor-creditor
relationship.
The freedoms require that a measure resulting in an obstacle to trade is necessary in
the sense that there may not be a measure that is less burdensome but equally suitable.
Accordingly, the issue is whether a choice lor the insolvency law other than the lex fori
concursus is equally suitable for the protection of the interest of optimal deployment.
The applicability of an insolvency law other than the lex fori coni -ursus does not by itsell
necessitate additional proceedings nor additional trustees.1"' Nevertheless, the difference
between plurality of proceedings and law and plurality of law alone appears to
be one of degree only. This may be illustrated by the mechanism adopted in the 1980
Draft I 'C Convention on Bankruptcy and similar proceedings in respect of distribution
and priority rights.1 '" The 1980 Draft provided for the creation of sub-estates to be
distributed in accordance with local law. This approach drew considerable criticism
because of its inherent complexity for the liquidator and related costs and is among
the main reasons for the 1 >raft's ultimate failure.1 1 1 This would apply with equal, if not
more, force in respect of deployment. A choice for a lex concursus other than that of
the forum would result in the creation of sub-estates for the purposes of deployment.
Although this may not actually result in a plurality of proceedings, it nevertheless does
not make things any easier for the liquidator nor, indeed, for those who might be
interested in (viable parts of) the estate as a 'going c o n c e r n ' . 1 ' '
It certainly is not impossible to come to effective cross-border insolvency regulation
through plurality. Indeed, the paradigm of modern cross-border insolvency regulation
is to a large extent based on the plurality of both law and forum.1 1 However, if the
question is whether plurality of insolvency law is equally suitable for the protection
( i f optim.il deployment as the unitary application of the lex fori eoneurfiif, then the
answer must be in the negative.1 1 1
Again, the tact that the regulatory intensity of universality of insolvency does not
exceed the limits of Community law does not in itself mean that Community law
sanctions the principle of universality to the full extent. Whether or not universality
is in tact obtained equally depends on the question of to what extent other Member
States are to accept universality. This is the question of territoriality and is addressed
in the next chapter.