2.3.7. Sitintnar
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The conclusion must be that interests such as employment and regional or national
economic infrastructure are not capable of justifying obstacles to trade. The interests
remain of an essentially economic nature, aimed at the protection of a Member State's
domestic economy. To the extent that the universal application of the law of deployment
purporting to protect these interests results in obstacles to trade, it must theretore
be considered to be unlawful. As far as the freedoms are concerned, the European
law of deployment appears generally to be restricted to the objective of value maximisation
for the benefit of creditors. It should be stressed that this restriction is
imposed not because it would go against 'bankruptcy law's logic' in Jackson's way.
If anything, the law on state aids suggests that objectives of insolvency law going
beyond the maximisation of value for the creditors may be compatible with the internal
market. However, because of the economic nature of the interests and the distortion
of competition involved, those objectives are not eligible for justification in the context
of the freedoms. Such objectives will have to be obtained through means other than
those resulting in an obstacle to trade. In other words, it goes against the 'logic and
limits' oi Community law.