2.3.5. Suite Aids Compatible with the Common Market
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State aids distorting competition and affecting interstate trade are not prohibited under
all circumstances. The law on state aids, like the law on the freedoms, recognises that
the objective of Article 3(g) EC of a common market with free competition does not
refer to the maximisation of competition on the market.'"' The objective is to be read
in conjunction with the broader aims of the Community outlined in Article 2 EC."
Accordingly, Article 8 7 ( 2 ) EC provides for particular state aids that are compatible
with the common market and Article 8 7 ( 3 ) EC provides for state aids that D M ; ' b e considered
compatible with the common market.
The most significant provision for the present purposes i s Article 87( 3 ) ( c ) I n accordance
with this provision, 'aid to facilitate certain economic activities or of certain economic
areas to the extent it does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent
contrary to the common interest' may be considered compatible with the common
market. The Commission has further elaborated these principles in respect of aid to
firms in difficulty in a notice containing the 'Community Guidelines on State Aid for
Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty'."' According to the Commission,
preventing the disappearance or the necessary restructuring of firms may prevent the
full benefits of the single market being felt for the Community as a whole.1"" On the
other hand, it continues, rescue or restructuring
may be justified, tor instance, by social or regional policy considerations, by the
need to take into account the beneficial role played by small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in the economy or, exceptionally, by the desirability of maintaining
a competitive market structure when the disappearance of firms could lead
to a monopoly or to a tight oligopolistic situation.1"'
The Commission will regard rescue and restructuring aid as benefiting the development
of e c o n o m i c activities and thus compatible with the common market where the
aid fulfils certain conditions. The basic (substantive) condition for restructuring aid
is that it must be shown that any 'distortion of competition will be offset by the benefits
flowing from the firm's survival'. The benefits in this equation include the net effect
of redundancies resulting from the firm going out of business, combined with the
effects on its suppliers, which would exacerbate local, regional or national employment
problems and a resulting monopoly or tight oligopolistic situation. "L In addition, aid
aimed at the mitigation of the social costs of restructuring, in particular relating to
unemployment, may also be justified as 'it brings economic benefits above and beyond
the interests of the firm concerned, facilitating structural change and reducing
hardship'.1 1"
The Commission's Guidelines on aid to firms in difficulty illustrate that interests such
as employment and national or regional economic infrastructure may justify distortions
of competition that would otherwise be incompatible with the common market.
This holds where state aids are granted in the course of insolvency proceedings. Consequently,
the wider objectives of the law of deployment cannot be said to be a prion
incompatible with the common market, even though such measures may distort competition.
However, it remains to be seen whether the same interests can therefore also
be recognised as mandatory requirements capable of justifying obstacles to trade under
the law of the freedoms.